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In In re Discipline of Simpson,

. . ... -

mi nmiii litii iil-iipil tin' I'liiiil'iiiH'iiijl purpose of attorney discipline:
• are two goals of disciplinary proceedings: 1) the protection of the publu
from iunn-..-r fraudulent, unethical or incompetent activities involving this attorney; anc 2 •
of the image and integrity of the attorneys, the bar association and the
as a whole. The real and vital issue to be determined is whether or not
n the whole of the evidence as submitted, is a fit and proper person to be
iiiitteii to continue in the practice of law.
x
The purpose of" this action is not to give punishment. I Punishment for any criminal
activity is handled in sentencing . . . .
Id. at 921-22 (emphasis added). It is through this lens that the Court should examine the case
now before it.
R;iv I hiilitif' h;is been punished for his drug use and possession. He has pled guilty to the
crime and been sentenced by one of his peers; he has been incarcerated; he has been piac-.d on
probation; he has been iotval lo lesign as a jiidp.

ulei pen Jiiif iiii|n.\k'luru' ( he has suffered

the humiliation of having his addiction broadcast to the public through every media forum and
man> media outlets throughout the state and natiou, he has lost the respect of man) of his
colleagues, lie has etiJiiirJ .,i divon r, ;md In* Jaih battles the demons of addiction. Enough is
enough. It is now time for this Court to demonstrate in a very real manner, to both the members
of the bar arid to tin public, thai an lumcsi utiiipelnit i Mm ml iiMni'im viholir nn iuldi<*lmii
illness will be pum&iieu out not destroyed. Instead, thai attorne\ w > he helped, and encouraged
to seek hen
o\\\\ In

^

:. -.-

aM
;

ich a process the public's coniiuuK^ ,;, .J.. ;a I t i;iu... ,UUA -.
;iilktik! J I "!(' Ihr-»c "iiiiiiple icMsons, Mr. Harding requests that this

Court adopt the recommendation of the Screening Panel,
1

:

I.

The Screening Panel Properly Concluded that Ray Harding Violated Rule
8.4(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

The Screening Panel determined that Mr. Harding's "decision to violate the law and use
illegal drugs was an intentional act," in violation of Rule 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. (Screening Panel Mem. at 2). The Panel reached this conclusion on the grounds that
the conduct was a "criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's . . . fitness as a lawyer."
Id. The Panel specifically found that Mr. Harding had not violated Rules 8.4(a), (c) or (d). Mr.
Harding readily concedes that his conduct violated Rule 8.4(b).
A number of courts that have examined an attorney's use of controlled substances have
concluded that such conduct does constitute a violation of Rule 8.4(b). In Florida Bar v.
Temmer, 632 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1994), the Respondent admitted using marijuana and crack
cocaine. The Florida Supreme Court found her conduct to violate Rule 8.4(b), (c) and (d) and
imposed a 90-day suspension followed by a three-year period of probation. The court cited to
Florida's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions in Drug Cases 10.3(a) which provided for a
90-day suspension if the Respondent had proven rehabilitation and obtained assistance from the
Florida Lawyer's Association, Inc. Id. at 1360.
In Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Gilbert, 789 A.2d 1 (Md. 1999), the
Maryland Supreme Court imposed a 30-day suspension in a case involving an attorney's
conviction of possession of cocaine. The court reviewed cases from throughout the nation
concluding that the possession of a controlled substance is sanctionable. See id. at 4-5 (citing
cases). The court went on to observe that courts had imposed sanctions for such conduct ranging
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from a reprimand to suspension for several years,1 id. at 6 (citing cases), and that each case must
be evaluated on its ownmeiits. Id

1 he court noted ti„.

...

!

case basis inch ided the attoi riey's history of past discipline, his or her efforts at rehabilitation,
and whether the conduct was directly related to the attorney's practice of law Id. Two years
later, in l((onn} iitwvana

i (immission m \ha i innti i Hiw 'i

>

i il II uiMil " ' In ilic

court impose an indefinite suspension on the attorney for his \ lolar^n of Ruic^ 8.4(b) and (d).
Id. at 125. The court based the more severe sanction on the fact that the attorney had relapsed
l

,r

••

-v\ assistance program and

he had Jailed to enroll in a pi OUT am to aid >b hi % ichabilitatu v
T~ h rQ uooding. *•
K. • *

'

ii i ii'ieijiini.111, Inn I, (lie

** .. .. .

- iV- 4i «/ attoine} • Possession of cocaine, marijuana, hashish, other

prescription medication and paraphernalia to constitute violations of Rules 8.4(b), (d) and (g).
,M <*.

court observed, luiss rs 11 llial I he .illuiin \ li.nl <i iiihstunliiil ininmll Il

sobriety, j i e had been successful in his rehabilitative efforts, he had become a leader in several
outpatient programs, and openly acknowledged his violation of the rules. Id at - - u

I he com i

-Miic censure, he had "paid the
price, that he is well on his way to recovery and that the profession will be well served by
respondent"s continued ability to practice his pi ofession " I /.
Finally, in People v. Ebbert, 873 P.2d 731 (Colo, 1994), the Colorado Supreme Court
ordered an attorney suspended for 30 days. The court found significant that he had experienced

Notably, the court did not cite a single case in which the attorney was subject to
disbarment.
3

personal and emotional problems at the time of his use, had no record of prior discipline,
participated in rehabilitation, had been sober for over a year and that he had self reported. The
court noted the inquiry panel's recommendation and determination that the suspension would
"encourage self-reporting of drug and alcohol problems." Id. at 731, 733.
In this case, Mr. Harding has violated Rule 8.4(b), and he does not contend otherwise.
Thus, the question posed before this Court is not whether Mr. Harding violated Rule 8.4(b) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct for he clearly did. The question is what sanction should be
imposed and toward what end. Protection of the public, viewed in a broad manner, should be
this Court's objective in imposing the sanction. Disbarment will not accomplish that objective,
nor will a period of substantial suspension. As discussed below, Mr. Harding urges the Court to
adopt the Screening Panel's recommendation and place him on probation for an extended period,
i.e., five years. This recommendation is well founded in law and will further the appropriate
objective of attorney discipline.
II.

The Screening Panel Correctly Applied the Standards for Imposing Attorney
Discipline

As discussed in the OPC's opening brief, the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
("Standards") govern imposition of the appropriate sanction. The Screening Panel considered,
and this Court should consider the following factors: (1) the duty violated; (2) the lawyer's
mental state; (3) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (4) the
existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Standards Rule 3.1. A consideration of each of
these factors leads to the conclusion that probation with or without a short period of suspension
is appropriate.

4

A.

The Duty Violated

Throughout its opening brief, the OPC argues that Mr. Harding should be held to a
"higher duty" because he was a judge. As a sitting judge, Mr. Harding was subject to the
jurisdiction of the Judicial Conduct Commission. The Commission instituted formal
proceedings against Mr. Harding which culminated with a recommendation to this Court that he
be removed from office. Obviously, such proceedings and recommendation exceed that an
attorney would receive. In other words, Mr. Harding already has been held to a higher
standard-he lost his judgship as a result.
A line must be drawn somewhere. Do we hold an attorney with 20 years experience in
the practice to a higher standard than a first-year associate when it comes to an addictive illness?
Do we distinguish between attorneys practicing in a metropolitan versus a rural area? Does age
become a factor? The fact is that addiction does not make such distinctions. While a more
experienced attorney may be held to a different standard with regard to competency or
management of client funds, no such "higher standard" should apply in a case such as this. See
Gooding, 917 P.2d at 418-19 (in case involving drug possession, no aggravating or mitigating
factors due to experience or lack thereof in the practice of law). Mr. Harding violated Rule
8.4(b)-that fact, and only that fact, constitutes the basis for this factor.
B.

Mr, Harding's Mental State

The OPC concedes that this factor is "ambiguous to its precise application." Opening Br.
at 16. The OPC states that "[a]n addiction is not something that comes about by accident; the
person taking illegal drugs knows they are illegal and still elects to participate." Id. This
statement is patently wrong.
5

As discussed in the Amicus Brief filed by Utah Lawyers Helping Lawyers, addiction is a
disease, not a choice to "participate." Amicus Brief at 12-14. Further, the evidence presented to
the Screening Panel established that his emotional state began to decline after the death of his
first wife in 1991, a serious motorcycle accident in 1997 and the divorce from his wife Anne.
Thus, Mr. Harding's addiction and mental state should be considered in determining the
appropriate sanction.
C.

The Potential or Actual Injury Caused by the Lawyer's Misconduct

The evidence before the screening panel was that Ray Harding's misconduct did not
cause injury to any person other than himself. Two district court judges testified regarding his
competence on the bench and that they never saw evidence of drug use by Mr. Harding at the
courthouse. His in-court clerk testified that at no time did he appear under the influence of
drugs, nor did she smell anything indicative of drug use coming from his chambers. Attorneys
who practiced before him did not indicate any abhorrent behavior on his part. In short, there is
no evidence whatever of injury to others. The evidence plainly supports the conclusion that Mr.
Harding did not engage in illegal drug use at work.
In Gilbert, the Maryland Supreme Court noted that courts generally are sensitive to an
attorney's efforts at rehabilitation, that courts consider the attorney's prior disciplinary history,
and significantly, an important consideration is whether the drug use is directly related to the
attorney's practice. Id at 7; cf People v. Madrid, 967 P.2d 628, 628 (Colo. 1998) (three year
suspension when attorney took cocaine in exchange for services). In this case, as the evidence
presented to the Screening Panel confirmed, Mr. Harding's drug use was not part of his daily
activity as a judge. Thus, despite the OPC's urging that the Mr. Harding's conduct "placed at
6

risk the very fiber of judicial administration," Opening Br. at 17-this factor is more appropriately
concerned with direct injury to clients. Plainly, illegal drug use by a district court judge has a
deleterious effect on the public's perception of the judiciary and the overall administration of
justice. Nevertheless, in terms of actual damage to clients or, in Mr. Harding's case litigants
appearing before him, there is no evidence that his performance was anything short of
exemplary.
D.

The Existence of Aggravating or Mitigating Factors

Once the Court determines the presumptive level of discipline, it may apply Rule 6 of the
Standards and consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances in deciding what sanction
ultimately should be imposed. In re Ince, 957 P.2d 1233, 1237 (Utah 1998). In Gooding, a case
involving possession of controlled substances, the Kansas Supreme Court considered each of the
factors reviewed by the Board for Discipline of Attorneys, ultimately placing the attorney on 2
years probation. 917 P.2d at 421. The analytical framework employed by that court is apropos
here and therefore is set forth as it relates to Mr. Harding:
Aggravating Factors
A. Prior record of discipline-None
B. Dishonest or selfish motives-None
C. Pattern of Misconduct-Mr. Harding has admitted to using over a period of time from
October 2001 until his arrest on July 13, 2002. While not insignificant, this pattern of
misconduct was minimal relative to the 10 years of drug use involved in Gooding.
D. Multiple offenses-Mr. Harding pled guilty to two Class A misdemeanors.
E. Obstruction of the disciplinary process-Mr. Harding has fully cooperated during the
7

disciplinary process.
F. Submission of false evidence or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary
process-No evidence
G. Refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct involved-Mr. Harding has
accepted full responsibility for the wrongfulness of his conduct.
H. Vulnerability of Victim-None.
I. Substantial experience in the practice of law-Not relevant.2
J. Indifference to making restitution-Not applicable.
K. Illegal conduct involving the use of a controlled substance-This is the basis of the
present action.
Mitigating Factors
A. Absence of a prior disciplinary record-Mr. Harding has no prior discipline.
B. Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive-Not applicable.
C. Personal or emotional problems-Mr. Harding had been suffering from the loss of his
first wife in 1991, a serious motorcycle accident in 1997 and the divorce from his wife Anne.
D. Timely good faith effort to make restitution-Not applicable.
E. Full and free disclosure to the disciplinary authority prior to the discovery of any
misconduct-Mr. Harding did not disclose his drug addiction prior to his arrest on July 13, 2002.
The import of this factor, as discussed in In re Ince is to ensure that the attorney is sincere in his

2

The Kansas Supreme Court reached this same conclusion. Gooding, 917 P.2d at 418.
The basis for such a conclusion is that the violation is not one of competence or some other
ground where the attorney should have learned from his or her experience. Drug addiction is
non-specific as to age or experience. Indeed, an attorney who has experienced years of stressful
practice might be even more prone to development of an addiction.
8

or her "desire to rectify the wrongdoing," and not simply acting under the "honesty of
compulsion." 957 P.2d at 1238. In this case, as the Screening Panel observed, Mr. Harding has
demonstrated his sincerity in rectifying his wrongdoing. While he cannot undo the damage done
as a result of his misconduct, he can, and has, become an example to others. He has become an
active participant in the "recovery community," he has spoken to numerous groups on the issue
of addiction and recovery, he has become active in the Lawyers Helping Lawyers program, both
within the state and nationally, he chairs meetings at local treatment centers and he serves as a
sponsor to other recovering addicts. In short, his recovery and contribution reflect an honest and
sincere desire to rectify the wrongdoing in the best way he can. For this, Ray Harding is to be
commended, not punished further.
F. Inexperience in the practice of law-Not applicable.
G. Good character and reputation in the community-This factor deserves significant
weight. As the letters from those who have practiced with and before Mr. Harding, he has at all
times demonstrated high moral character and competence in the practice of law. Two judges
stepped forward to testify on his behalf before the Screening Panel. The OPC acknowledges the
breadth of testimonial and written support of Mr. Harding's good reputation and character, but
attempts to minimize the effect by arguing that "this mitigation is entitled to little weight unless
the witnesses are shown to have been aware of the full extent of Mr. Harding's misconduct."
Opening Br. at 21. This argument, however, ignores the fact that the "full extent" of Mr.
Harding's misconduct was broadcast on every network, appeared in every major newspaper and
was aired on the radio in Utah. Unless these witnesses were oblivious to the reported news, they
plainly knew the full extent of his misconduct. Nonetheless, they came forward in support. This
9

factor is entitled to substantial weight.
H. Physical disability-None.
I. Mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when:
(1) The respondent is affected by substance abuse-There certainly is evidence
before the Court that Mr. Harding had a chemical dependancy and was affected by the substance
abuse.
(2) The substance abuse causally contributed to the misconduct-The substance
abuse and Mr. Harding's subsequent arrest are the subject of this proceeding.
(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability is
demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation-Evidence
presented to the Screening Panel was that Mr. Harding had remained sober for over 18 months
(now close to 2 years), he received in-patient treatment followed by intensive aftercare, he
continues with the 12-step program, and he is more than 95% likely to remain drug free.
Screening Panel Mem. at 4. This reflects significant recovery and a sustained period of
rehabilitation.
(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of the misconduct is
unlikely-As stated above, Mr. Harding is clean and sober, he has been so for 2 years and he is
more than 95% likely to remain drug free.
J. Unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings-Not applicable.
K. Interim reform-Not applicable.
L. Imposition of other penalties or sanctions-As discussed above, Mr. Harding has been
convicted of two misdemeanors, incarcerated, placed on probation and he has resigned his
10

judgship. He has received significant punishment.
M. Remorse-Mr. Harding has demonstrated significant remorse, although he has chosen
to channel that remorse into productive assistance to others with addiction illnesses.
N. Remoteness of prior offenses-None.
In conclusion, the mitigating factors are numerous and significant. The aggravating
factors do not weigh heavily against Mr. Harding. While the burden articulated in In re Ince is
admittedly high, this case warrants departure from the presumptive sanction of suspension.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Harding respectfully requests that the Court dismiss this
case. In the alternative, Mr. Harding requests that the Court adopt the findings and conclusions
of the Screening Panel imposing a five-year period of probation, to include random drug testing
and participation in a 12-step program on an on-going basis.
DATED this^Sday of April, 2004
SKORDASjCASTOlJj & MORGAN, LLC.

Jack/M. ^orgatyJr.
Gregory G. Skoraas
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
,/lT
I hereby certify that on this^f day of April, 2004, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent was mailed to the following:
Billy L. Walker
Senior Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
u.
Skorda$rCaston^
Morgan, LLC.
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